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AGENDA FOR CANADIAN LABOUR
LAW REFORM: A LITTLE LIBERAL
LAW, MUCH MORE DEMOCRATIC
SOCIALIST POLITICS©
By H.J.

GLASBEEK!

Statutory collective bargaining has been the linchpin of Canadian industrial
relations since World War I. It yielded benefits to large segments of workers,
although its reach and impact were always exaggerated. As the economic
entente which underpinned the scheme is unravelling, workers fight desperately
to hang onto a system which, in retrospect, looks even better than it did before.
But the narrow, male-centred, economic premises of collective bargaining
make statutory collective bargaining reform a poor vehicle with which to offset
employer attacks on the working classes. An agenda which seeks to link the
economic and the political, men and women, must be developed. This can be
done, in part, by exploiting some of the claims (contrast realities) of the
existing industrial relations system. But, more is needed; some suggestions are
offered.
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I. THE WELL-KNOWN PROBLEMS
Capitalism is restructuring. Prevailing economic dogma suggests
that this restructuring is mandated by the unstoppable movement
towards unfettered, world-wide free trade. This understanding implies
that this movement is to be welcomed, as capitalist relations of
production will work finally as they are meant to do. The accompanying
argument for the completely free movement of capital, goods, services,
and labour is theoretically elegant. To better meet global demands,
private actors, wherever situated, should be enabled to maximize their
resources and capacities without being bound by national boundaries.
The optimum division of productive activities will ensue, generating the
greatest amount of welfare possible for the world as a whole.
This unchained free trade model does not provide any kind of
guarantee that unrestricted, global production and trading will make any
particular country better off. Even if all of the productive potential of
truly liberalized and globalized markets is realized, the way in which the
spoils are to be distributed is still left up in the air. The model ignores
the starting point of the various private actors situated in different parts
of the world. Given the uneven distribution of military, political, and
economic power, imbalances and inequities may well be, indeed, are
likely to be, worsened. This does not seem to bother the fundamentalist
economic proponents of unfettered trade, who view it as the principal
motor of economic growth.
The vociferous intellectual and ideological support for the
proposition that a world-wide free trade zone is inevitable makes it
easier for localized capitalists to insist that the model be applied within
their own nation. Their contention-that any government which erects
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barriers impeding productivity and trade puts its nation and citizenry at a
serious economic disadvantage-has increasing resonance and
respectability. They are able to generate intense pressure on
governments to take measures which will give the competitive model full
rein. Individual entrepreneurs are able to back this self-interested
pleading by threats to leave the jurisdiction. This well-worn strategy has
gained credibility due to the globalization of competition; the new
technologies which make world-wide production more feasible; and new
banking, communications, and transportation facilities, which have
improved the potential to integrate globally conducted business and
production.1
All of this means that, even if they are unable to install a
government of their choosing, as they have failed to do in several
Canadian provinces recently, the employing classes are able to dictate
the free trade model as the macroeconomic policy to be pursued by the
state. As a result, labouring classes have lost a great deal of ground in
the last decade and a half. In North America, more people are now
working longer for less 2 Workers have lost many of the collective
bargaining rights they believed they had. They seem unable to convince
their political rulers to adopt a different growth model,3 even though
their intellectual allies have tried to put a number of viable alternative
models on the table for discussion. 4
Typically, progressive commentators and labour leaders promote
schemes to shift revenues back to local governments and/or promote the
1 The literature on the global economic revolution is voluminous. It includes: K. Ohmae,
TriadPower The Coming Shape of Global Competition (New York- Free Press, 1985); R.J. Barnet &
R.E. Muller, Global Reach: The Power of the MultinationalCorporations(New York. Simon and

Schuster, 1974); S. Strange, States and Markets (London: Pinter, 1988); A. Maddison, The World
Economy in the 20th Century, (Paris: oEcD, 1989); D. Drache & M.S. Gertler, eds., The New Era of
Global Competition: State Policy and Market Power (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press,

1991); J. Grunwald & K. Flamm, The Global Factory: Foreign Assembly in InternationalTrade
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985); and M.L Dertouzos, RX. Lester & K.M. Solow,
Made inAmerica: Regainingthe ProductiveEdge (Cambridge, Mass.: M.LT. Press, 1989).

2 J.B. Schor, The OverworkedAmerican: The UnerpectedDecline ofLeisure (New Yorlk Basic
Books, 1991); A. Donner, Working Tunes: The Report of the Ontario Task Force on Hours of Work

and Overtime (Toronto: Ontario Task Force on Hours of Work and Overtime, 1987).
3 For an overview, see D. Drache & H.J. Glasbeek, The Changing Workplace: Reshaping
Canada'sIndustrialRelationsSystem (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1992).
4 For a popular rendition and overview of the American literature, see N. Mills, eui, "Labor's

Future?" (1992) 39:1 Dissent 31, particularly the essays by D. Brody, K.Reich, and N. Salvatore; for
a more integrated and scholarly discussion, see . MathewsAge of Democracy: The Politicsof PostFordism (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1989); for Canadian exemplars, see D. Drache, ed.,
Getting on Track. Social Democratic Strategiesfor Ontario (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University

Press, 1992).
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creation of new federal loan guarantee schemes to enable more money
to be spent on infrastructure and affordable housing. This, they argue,
will improve the quality of life and create necessary productive
employment. In addition, they make demands to make it more costly to
engage in speculative trading in stock markets, something which is seen
by these critics as a waste of national resources. Inflation and interest
rates have made it more productive for capitalists to invest in buying
each other's shares, rather than invest in research and development and
new production. This was particularly true during the 1980s. In short, it
is urged that there should be a return to some sort of social
Keynesianism, rather than a continued reliance on the kind of wasteful
military Keynesianism of the Thatcher and Reagan regimes,5 mimicked
here as a result of the United States' political and economic influence
and the like-minded ideology of some of the elected governments in
Canada.
However, the overwhelming power of big business right now is
such that these Keynesian-type proposals are portrayed, and often
perceived, as the advocacy of a violent economic revolution.
Consequently, even in Canadian provinces with New Democratic Party
governments, this kind of macroeconomic strategy does not seem to be
on the agenda. Yet, despite their obvious lack of success, the opponents
of unfettered free trade persist in their arguments for different
approaches by governments, and in their demands that governments
should engineer on-the-ground changes in the organization of
productive activities. It is their pivotal contention that we should no
longer rely on decentralized, uncoordinated competition amongst
atomistic producers. Would-be Keynesians argue that, in Canada, there
are several large oligopolistically-organized firms occupying the
commanding heights of any one industry who are in a position to sweat
the workforces of their supplier firms who, by contrast, are in fierce
competition with one another for contracts from the dominant
corporations. This is wasteful and harmful to workers. There is a need,
therefore, to have industrial sectors---comprised of oligopolisticallyplaced employers and satellites of medium and small competing
firms--consciously integrated as cooperating producing units. This
would permit discrete firms, using complementary technologies, to
harmonize their activities. Full-blooded use of the new technological
capacities would then lead to the production of high quality goods for
both domestic and trading purposes. Countries like Canada would be
5 F. Block, PostindusMalPossibilities:ACritiqueofEconomic Discourse (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1990); and R.B. Reich, "Beyond Free Trade" (1983) 61:4 Foreign Affairs 773.
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able to build high, value-added niches, which would give them a
competitive edge in the world.6 There would be no need to make the
exertion of a downward pressure on working conditions a principal tool
in the maintenance of profits.
This vision sees a restructured economy which has the potential
to support a shorter work week, flexible work hours, and a productive
system, which dovetails closely with workers' needs and a system of selfmanagement. One justifying rationale is that more sovereign and secure
workers are, in the end, more productive workers. This scenario,
therefore, has strong appeal not only to Keynesians but also to
democratic socialists, who see it as having the potential to establish more
economic democracy at the ground level, as well as bringing more
immediate economic welfare to all workers. 7
Not surprisingly, this aspect of the reformist proposals also has
had limited sway with policy makers. It urges a more direct
interventionist, restructuring role for the state at a time when the
political clout of the employing classes vastly outweighs that of labour
and its allies. Employers, therefore, indicate that they are only willing to
accept those features of the progressive models that suit them (i.e., more
government subvention for research and development, the training of
the workforce at public cost, etc.). They are effective on this front. They
are equally effective in their rejection of those aspects that would
promote trade union strength, worker participation, or those that call for
an enriched social nets
6 For an overview of the extensive literature on this kind of industrial strategy, see M. Storper
& R. Walker, The CapitalistImperative: Territory, Technology and Industrial Growth (Oxford:
University Press, 1989); D. Drache, edl, supra note 4; and R.W. Cox, Production, Powerand World
Order:SocialForcesin the Makingof listoMy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).
7 S.Gindin & D. Robertson, "Alternatives to Competitiveness" in D. Drache, ed., supranote 4
at 32.
8 Canadian capital's efforts on this front seem to be all too successful. Thus, the Ontario New
Democratic Party government appears to be very eager to establish cooperatively-based training
and skills programmes, backed by government-sponsored research and development, and financing
for small, innovative business. This agenda is posited on the notion that, as traditional mass
assembly manufacturing and resource industries are faltering and becoming sunset sectors, Ontario
should develop special niches based on newly developed skills and natural advantages. While it is
hoped that this will lead to high value-added productivity and jobs, it certainly furnishes employers
with the kinds of support they are seeking. This scenario is like that of more conservative
governments (such as that of the Ontario Liberal government, which preceded the NDP one), as
enunciated in the Report of the Ontario's Premier Council, or other such government reports. For
a review of prestigious reports recommending these kinds of policies, see A.Blais, "'he Debate on
Canadian Industrial Policy" in A.Blals, ed., Royal Commission on the Economic Union and
Development Prospectsfor Canada:IndusthialPolicy, vol. 44 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1986).
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Indeed, while employers are asking governments to help them
become more competitive, including aiding them with the establishment
of more cooperative capital-labour relations, employers are also
invoking the assistance of labour relations boards, courts, and
legislatures to launch a full-scale attack on rights which labour had won
over time. Alternative strategies, based on a view of the world in which
concern for workers' welfare would be central, sound far-fetched and
unrealistic because they are made as the daily struggles, which labour
and its allies wage, concentrate on restoring the institution of collective
bargaining and a level of unionization developed during a totally
different economic and social era. These labour struggles are provoked
because, in response to business' new demands, Canadian governments
have set out to constrain workers' bargaining rights 9 at a time of massive
decline in employment in the manufacturing and resource industries,
where labour's organizational base had been most prominent and
successful. There is, therefore, a highly visible campaign by labour to get
law reforms, which will make it easier for unions to organize, to be
certified, and to bargain in the new employment growth settings, as they
were able to do in the much different employment and economic
circumstances of the 1960s and 1970s. The most obvious difference
between the two eras is that the new growth centres today are ones in
which collective bargaining has not taken root in the past. They are
peopled by small employers located in the service sectors, as opposed to
large, mass assembly and resource industry businesses.
But, even if necessary gains are made on these fronts, it is
unlikely that the kind of union rights that will be obtained and the kind
of unions that will be formed will slow down capital's pursuit of the
pristine competitive model. This is due to the fact that unionization will
not become powerful where it matters and, where it does become
established, there may not be many benefits to be had. More
importantly, the kind of collective bargaining that is being protected and
embedded by seeking these kinds of reforms is ill-suited to deal with new
employer-employee circumstances. Indeed, in part, it is the nature of

9 The way in which, in the last decade or so, the legislatures and labour relations boards,
supported by the courts, have attacked collective bargaining and unionism is well documented: see
L. Panitch & D. Swartz, The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms:From Consent to Coercion Revisited,
rev. ed. (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988); HJ. Glasbeek, "Labour Relations Policy and Law as
Mechanisms of Adjustment" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall LJ. 179; L. Haiven, S. McBride & J. Shields,
eds, RegulatingLabour: The State, Neo-Conservatism and IndustrialRelations (Toronto: Garamond
Press, 1990); . Fudge, "Labour, The New Constitution and Old Style Liberalism" in Queen's
University, ed., Labour Law Under the Charter (Kingston: Queen's Law Journal and Industrial
Relations Centre, 1988) 61.
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that institution that has made it so easy for capital to shake off labour's
resistance to its drive to restructure the political economy of our nation.
What is needed, from labour's perspective, is to attack the extant legal
model of capital-labour regulation from within and, thereby, solidify the
economic bargaining rights of workers in such a way that they can
become a meaningful political force. Only if this can be done will it be
possible to affect state policies in such a way as to halt the forward
march of liberalized trade policies and all the pain and suffering that
they entail.
II. A SNAPSHOT OF CANADA'S INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
SYSTEM
Industrial relations in Canada is constituted by three major
schemes, which modify the market by different means and degrees.
They are seen as regulating different situations and people, and it is
customary to treat them as if they were only connected in the most
attenuated way. But, it is vital to understand that these schemes are
closely interrelated and that their operations impact on each other quite
directly.
A. Collective Bargainingin the PrivateSector
The advent of the Wagner Act10 industrial relations model in
North America constituted a large step forward for labour. It forced
employers to bargain only with the chosen representative of its workers.
This diminished competition amongst workers. It also provided a
measure of representative democracy as workers were left as free as
possible to choose a union that they could influence. Members were in a
position to have their union favour a particular bargaining stance, or to
determine which claims of which workers it should pursue when disputes
arose during the life of a collective agreement. Despite this progressive
approach towards worker needs, a major brake on employee power was
built into this regime. The scheme gave bargaining rights on an
employer-by-employer basis only; it was not intended to promote the
reduction of competition amongst workers on an industry-by-industry,
region-by-region, or national basis. But, within its constraints, the state
10

NationalLabourRelations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982) [hereinafter WagnerAct] was
adopted in Canada in the 1940s.
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purported to let the parties decide for themselves what kind of collective
agreements should govern their working relationship. Collective
bargaining North American-style was meant to reflect the atomized
market relationships of private actors as much as possible while allowing
for some unionization.
B. Collective Bargainingin the Public Sector
When collective bargaining came to Canada's public sectors, the
schemes adopted were posited on the notion that, as in the private
sector, workers should be entitled to choose and control their own
unions, and that employers should be forced to bargain with the workers'
chosen agent. The bargaining was to be done on an institution-byinstitution, or a government agency-by-agency basis. That is, it was to
function as closely to an employer-by-employer model as could be
fashioned in the public sector. The idea was that collective bargaining in
the public sector should reflect the market ideal; workers should try to
settle their work conditions through a free bargaining scheme which
mirrored the one used in the private market sector. The "employer" was
to be an independent enterprise with a budget not directly controlled by
intervening politicians. It was understood, of course, that curtailments
could be put on this new worker bargaining freedom. Because of the
kinds of services public sector workers render, electorally-accountable
.governments have always retained the right to intervene on behalf of the
public interest. That is, they can suspend bargaining rights and, thereby,
dictate conditions, rather than leave them to be decided by the marketlike forces supposedly constructed to regulate public sector capitallabour conflicts in notionally autonomous and discrete settings.
C. Regulatingthe Left-overs
The remaining members of the workforce, the unorganized, who
comprise the majority of workers, were the most exposed to exploitation.
They were left to be regulated by the law of the individual contract of
employment. The effect of this legal doctrine is to promote and to
sanction the fiercest forms of competition amongst workers for jobs.
The ensuing immiseration of many of these workers forced the state to
provide minimum employment standards by direct legislative fiat.
Somewhat ironically-as Canada is a liberal capitalist democracy-these
workers, and all others, are supported by equality of opportunity, human
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rights, and access laws to help them participate in this fragmented set of
labour markets where many are destined to be at a bargaining
disadvantage.
III. SOME REALITIES OF CANADA'S INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS SYSTEM
Inasmuch as the Canadian employing classes apprehend
resistance to their efforts to institute hyperliberalism as a way of life,
they expect it to be led by the union movement. After all, it has a
legitimate place in Canada's political economy. As long as twenty-five
years ago, it was confidently argued that the strength, protection, and
participatory rights won through collective bargaining, complemented by
equality of opportunity and minimum standards of employment legal
protection for the less fortunate, were creating a- new industrial
citizenship. The potential for political and economic advances for
workers, especially their ability to curtail the exercise of new economic
power by employers, was seen as having been exponentially increased by
the institution of collective bargaining. 11 But, there never was anything
in either the logic or the operation of that system, which will now help
unions in their efforts to resist the demands for concessions and more
flexibility by employers who are bent on changing workplace relations
and macroeconomic policies. This is so because the WagnerAct model
constitutes the smallest step up possible from the previous legal capitallabour regulatory scheme: the individual contract of employment law. If
anything, the assumption that the inherent ideology of private contractmaking is to be the basis of a well functioning liberal democratic
capitalist society was deepened by this model of collective bargaining.
This has had implications for the ways in which workers can unionize,
vis-Li-vis whom they can unionize, which workers can unionize, and the
way in which trade unions can behave. A sketch of some of the ensuing
limitations follows, indicating why the mere reform of existing collective
bargaining labour law is not the appropriate response to the employerdriven restructuring of Canada's political economy and the

11 H.W.Arthurs, "Developing Industrial Citizenship: A Challenge for Canada's Second
Century" (1967) 45 Can. Bar. Rev. 786.

242

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOj_ 31 No. 2

accompanying efforts to reshape workplace practices to fit in with these
12
new modes of production.
A. The WagnerAct Model Requires Workers to Opt into Unionization
There is no starting assumption that workers are to be unionized
unless something to the contrary is indicated. This means that workers
must take positive action to become organized. There is nothing in the
scheme which requires the employer to assist this organization and,
given the liberal premises of the scheme, the employer, as an individual,
continues to be free to control his assets. This means .that he can keep
people off his premises and insist that, during contracted-for work hours,
there are to be no interruptions. This has made organization a
nightmare where workers face intransigent employers. There is
something tragicomical about the fact that workers may have to organize
furtively, as if they were establishing some kind of underground
organization. They meet secretly, in hotels and motels, to convince each
other to engage in what is considered to be, according to public cant, the
honourable act of unionization. This situation is ripe for exploitation by
employers who want to resist unionization. Much of contemporary
labour law reform activity in Canada, therefore, is aimed at overcoming
such difficulties of unionization, especially in settings which,
traditionally, have been non-unionized.1 3
12 Elsewhere, I have offered more detailed accounts of how and why Canada's industrial
relations system has been much less advantageous than its liberal pluralist proponents had argued:
see HJ. Glasbeek, "Law: Real and Ideological Constraints on the Working Class" in D. Gibson &
J.K. Baldwin, eds., Law in a Cynical Society?: Opinion and Law in the 1980's (Calgary: Carswell
1985) 282; HJ. Glasbeek, "Voluntarism, Liberalism and Grievance Arbitration: Holy Grail,
Romance and Real Life" in G. England, ed., Essays in Labour Relations Law (Don Mills: CCH
Canadian, 1986) 57; and Glasbeek, supra note 9.
13
After this was written, the NDP government in Ontario passed some contentious legislation
to respond to labour's demands on this front: LabourRelations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L-2, as am. by
S.O. 1992, c.21 [hereinafter LabourRelationsAct]. TheAct makes it more difficult for employers to
help workers lodge petitions opposing unionization by the imposition of a time limit; easier for
workers to organize in shopping malls by addressing some of the difficulties made apparent by the
Eaton's strike in Toronto; and it gives the Labour Relations Board procedural assistance so that it
can redress employer anti-union tactics more quickly during an organization campaign. But the
reforms leave the fundamentals of the opt-in system untouched. Intransigent employers will not be
severely handicapped. Yet, business has been shrill in its opposition. It is all a question of relativity.
However primitive Canada's approach to organization may be, it is viewed as being far more
generous than that of the United States. Weiler has made a big impact on American labour law
discussions by urging Americans, from his prestigious seat at Harvard Law School, to look to the
Canadian regimes for leadership if they want to help the downward slide of the institution of
collective bargaining in the United States. See P.C. Weiler, "Promises to Keep: Securing Workers'
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B. The Scheme is Liberal in Conception
The scheme supports the right of an individual worker to choose
a union or no union at all. As a parallel right, it supports the employer's
right to free speech. Most importantly, the employer may freely use
his 14 property as he wills because, in a true liberal polity, one's
personality includes one's property rights. Essentially, the employer
remains free to decide whether or not to use such property to enter into,
or extinguish labour contracts. Of course, once they are entered into,
the employer is subject to whatever contractual arrangements have been
made. Other than that, the employer's freedom is not to be impaired.
The freedom to contract precepts and the facilitating legal techniques
they have spawned enable employers to avoid the effects, or the
potential effects, of worker collectivization.
Employers can employ independent contractors to do jobs
needed for their productive activities. By contracting work out or subcontracting to have others do it, they can avoid the effect of
unionization. Inevitably, they seek to do so- s In Canada, this has led to
a number of protective pieces of legislation which allow people
contracting with employers in this way to form unions or become part of
an existing bargaining unit. This only applies if the contracted worker's
position is as dependent on the employer for her living as that of the
average worker in a bargaining unit. These are dependent contract
provisions.1 6
Rights to Self-Organization under the NLRA" (1983) 96 Harv. L Rev. 1769; P.C. Weiler, "Striking
a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects For Union Representation" (1984) 98

Harv. L Rev. 351; and P.C. Weiler, "Milestone or Tombstone: The Wagner Act at Fifty" (1986) 23
Harv. J. Legis. 1. For a view which emphasizes the status quo, perhaps even regressive, nature of the

Weiler proposals, see E. Tucker, Book Review of Governing the Workplace: The Future of Labour
andEmployment Law by P.C. Weiler (1991) 36 McGill L J. 1480.

14 Editor's note: References to employers using the masculine pronoun and to employees
using the feminine pronoun are deliberate in order to point to the interrelation of economic and
patriarchial domination.
15 This managerial prerogative has been respected by arbitral jurisprudence since the key

decision in Re United Steelworkers of America and Russelsteel Ltd. (1966), 17 L.A.C. 253 (H.W.
Arthurs). See E.E. Palmer & B.M. Palmer, Collective Agreement Arbitration in Canada, 3d ed.

(Toronto: Butterworths, 1991). As far as labour relations boards are concerned, they will interfere
with this managerial prerogative only when the contracting-out of bargaining unit work is deemed to
be motivated by anti-union animus, a difficult-to-prove requirement, which leaves employers with a
great deal of manipulative power, see G.W. Adams, CanadianLabourLaw: A Comprehensive Text

(Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1985) 506ff.
16 The conceptual and social justifications for these provisions were furbished in a finely
crafted article by H.W. Arthurs, "The Dependent Contractor: A Study of the Legal Problems of
Countervailing Power" (1965) 16 U.T.LJ. 89.
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Employers can also fragment their enterprise by a clever use of
the corporate vehicle. This enables them to hive off, as apparently
discrete, separate activities, their production, transportation, and
marketing functions, etc. Thus, unionization may be made more difficult
and, where unavoidable, less effective. Legislative redress was provided
to blunt the effectiveness of these kinds of anti-union activities, resulting
17
in statutory clauses known'as related employer provisions.
Similarly, employers may seek to rid themselves of the effects of
collective agreements and/or unions by selling off some of the productive
work done in a bargaining unit to another entity. Statutory provisions
have been won to ward off the more direct of these kind of attacks on
union rights as well. These are successor right provisions.18
All of these reactive safeguarding mechanisms have proven to be
permeable; they provide imperfect protections against clever employer
manipulation. For instance, the dependent contractor provisions have
been interpreted on a case-by-case basis by labour relations boards. The
uncertainty which ensues has meant that employers who might want to
resort to fragmentation and splitting as an anti-union stratagem do not
feel all that inhibited.19
Similarly, the employers who have sold part of their enterprise to
another grouping have sometimes escaped their bargaining unit
obligations, depending on whether or not a labour relations board has
17

For example, CanadaLabour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, s. 35; LabourRelationsCode, S.A.
1988, c. L-1.2, s. 45; IndustrialRelationsAct,R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 212, s. 37; and LabourRelations Act, s.
1(4).
18 For an early, useful account of the successor rights problem and attempted resolution, see
R.O. McDowell, "The Successor Rights and Related Employer Provisions of the Ontario Labour
Relations Act" in Labour Law: Aspects for the General Practitioner (Toronto: Canadian Bar
Association (Ontario), 1979) (Chair. C.M. McKeown).
19
Like all decision-making bodies, which have discretionary interpretative powers, the labour
relations boards are swayed by the context in which they have to make their decisions. Given the
need to expand the scope of collective bargaining, boards could be expected to define people as
employees whom common law courts, in different contexts and with a different mindset, might well
have categorized as independent contractors. There is evidence that this is what happened initially:
compare ReadyMix Concrete (South East) Ltd. v. MinisterofPensionsand NationalInsurance, [1968
2 Q.B. 497 with Mount Nermo Truckers Association v. Nelson Crushed Stone, [1977] O.L.R.B. Rep.
104. But, the courts, too, have become aware that a new world exists and some observers have
argued that the approach taken by boards and courts became quite congruent: see M. Bendel, "The
Dependent Contractor: An Unnecessary and Flawed Development in Canadian Labour Law"
(1982) 32 U.T.L.J. 374. This illustrates the great room for manoeuvring which all these tribunals
have. What this means is that general trends in decision making can be identified with the benefit
of hindsight, but that results in any one case are quite unpredictable; compare Ontario Taxi
Association v. Seven-Eleven Taxi Ltd., [1976] O.L.R.B. Rep. 134 [hereinafter Seven-Eleven] with
Niagara Falls Co-operative Tax Owners Association v. Niagara Veteran Taxi (1980), 80 C.L.LC.
16,040 (O.LRB.).
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found that the core of their business had been sold or not. The meaning
of core is rather elastic. Such factors as time gaps and continuity in
customer lists have come to play a part. Boards have'a good deal of
discretion. Labour boards understand that if employers can escape
collective bargaining obligations just by selling a part of their business to
others, their very raisond'etre may be undermined. These agencies, after
all, are in the business of promoting and maintaining a legitimating level
of bargaining rights. Thus, as pressure mounts on employers to
destabilize trade unions, labour relations boards have used the flexibility
inherent in the discretionary rules to enable them to save the status of
certified unions. But, at the same time-intriguingly from a lawyer's
point of view-there are indications that employers who have failed in
their attempt to get rid of a union by selling part of their enterprise at
the labour relations boards' level,. have been
able to use the courts to
20
have their right to be "flexible" vindicated.
Similarly, with respect to the related employer provisions,
decisions of labour relations boards can be characterized as emphasizing
the maintenance of existing bargaining rights. Summarizing crudely, the
brunt of their decision making on this front suggests that businesses
must be engaged and associated in activities under common control or
direction before they will be treated as related, that is, as preserving
trade union and workers' rights. Criteria such as common ownership or
financial control, common management, interrelationship of operations
of the various businesses, representation to the public as to whether or
not there is a single integrated enterprise, centralized control of labour
relations, all matter. Whether or not there is a use of common
stationery, bankers and accountants, trade marks and signs, common
supervision and invoicing procedures, and whether or not employees are
paid out of the same chequing account and whether or not there is much
interchange of employees between the allegedly related activities, may

20 For a sample of cases which illustrate this trend, as well as the unpredictability and
manipulative power of board decisions in this area, see GordonsMarkets Ltd. andR.C U., Local 206,
[1978] 2 C.L.R.B.R. 460 (O.L.R.B.); Uncle Ben's Industries and CanadianUnion of United Brewery
Workers, Local 300, [1979] 2 CL1-B.R. 125 (B.CLR.B.); United Food and Commercial Workers v.
Price Waterhouse Ltd. (1983), 83 CLLC. 16,045 (O.LR.B.); CB.RIT.G.W. and KJ.R. Associates,
[1979] 2 C.LR.B.RL 245; and BritishAmerican Bank Note Co. andSteel PlatePrinters,Local 6, [1979]
2 C.L.R.B.R. 122 (O.LR.B.). For an example of restrictive judicial review, see Syndicat National
des Employs de la Commission Scolaire Rigionale de l'Outaouaisv. Union des Employs de Service,
Local 298 (1989), 89 C.LLC. 14,045 (S.C.C.). For an illustration of how central this fight is,
consider the ongoing saga in the post office: CanadaPost Corp. and CU.P.W. (Nieman'sPharmacy)
(1989),4 C.LIRB.R. (2d) 161; CanadaPost Corp.and CU.P.W. (Sheldon Manly DrugsLtd.) (1987),
1 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 218; and Canada Post Corp. and C.U.P.W. (Rideau Pharmacy) (1989), 1
C.LR.B.R. (2d) 239.
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also enter into the calculations 2 1 In recent times, there has been an
increasing tendency by labour relations boards to use these
interpretative tools to stop some contracting-in and some contractingout, tactics which they see as too easily available as means by which to
avoid bargaining unit obligations. Boards seem to be asking themselves
whether or not the work being contracted-in or contracted-out is central
or peripheral to the bargaining employers' enterprise. If it is peripheral,
contracting-in or contracting out will be permitted; that is, it will not be
seen as offending the related employer provision.2 2
In short, there is an understanding and general
acknowledgement that employers are capable of running integrated
enterprises through technically discrete legal vehicles. The boards, to
preserve their own domain and the legitimacy of the industrial relations
regime, are apparently feeling the need to pierce those legal veils which
have been created, or to knock down some of the contracting
arrangements which seek to put up "Chinese walls" between associated
employer enterprises in order to attack bargaining rights. Boards are
able to use existing, easily moulded criteria to hold integrated businesses
to be one business for the purposes of the institution of collective
bargaining. As will be argued, this logic may prove useful to would-be
reformers but, thus far, pressured employers do not seem to have been
discouraged very much from using these kinds of union-busting tactics.
C. Employer-by-EmployerBargainingis the Vision
Although workers have to organize on a localized basis, a
common misapprehension arises because local unions belong to national
or international organizations, often described as "Big Labour," a truly
powerful countervailing force. However, locals cannot act with the
power of the integrated union when it comes to bargaining with an
individual employer. While administrative and financial aid may be
given to a member local by its parent, only that local bargaining agent
can use economic force. Sympathy strikes and boycotts are illegal. 23
21

No one criterion, or set of criteria, is identifiable as more important than others, leaving the
labour relations boards with a great deal of room to manoeuvre.
22 For a good, detailed analysis, see G. England, "The Future of Collective Bargaining Law:
The Case of Labour Subcontracting" in I. McKenna, ed., Labour Relations into the 1990s: Papers
Presentedat The Conference on LabourRelationsinto the 1990s (Don Mills: CCH Canadian, 1989) 85.

23 In part, this is offset by the ally doctrine, which makes picketing at a secondary site legal if
the relationship between the two is characterized as being so integrated that, for the purposes of
labour law, the two businesses should be treated as one. But, as workers can never be certain that
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Employers who are component parts of an integrated enterprise are not
handicapped in the same way. The overall controller of the enterprise is
not legally inhibited from offsetting the economic impact of a legal strike
on any one of its components. 24
This is not to say that there are no employer-wide, region-wide
or industry-wide bargaining schemes. But, overwhelmingly, these have
been engineered by employers when they feel this to be advantageous to
them. Indeed, when employers have met with union opposition to
confront their demand for industry- or region-wide bargaining-as they
have when unions have been in a position to exploit their monopoly and
an industry's competitiveness (as in construction)-they have sought,
and received, the help of labour relations boards and legislatures.25
In sum, fragmented bargaining serves as a control on labour
cohesiveness and diminishes the impact of labour militancy when it does
the ally doctrine will aid them, this safeguard is not a very helpful one.
24 The fact that enterprises operate as a functioning unit, regardless of legal divisions and
corporate intricacies, indeed heedless of nation state boundaries, is commonplace to business
analysts and economists. Labour law, however, makes no allowances for this, except in-so-far as
related or affiliated businesses, successor, and dependent contractor statutory provisions do. These,
as seen, have been narrowly interpreted. A topical illustration of the difficulties for unions, which
the gap between economic reality and the reality of labour law creates, is provided by the tactics of
"restructuring" currently employed by General Motors (oM). The head' office of this giant
corporation has announced that it will shut down many of its plants and that the unlucky ones will
be the ones least useful to General Motors as a whole. Workers in different locales are forced to
compete with each other, despite the fact that the automobile industry was one of those spheres
where integrated, rather than fragmented, bargaining has been the norm. Yet, GM, the employing
enterprise, is able to rely on the local-by-local model to attain its restructuring aims. Here it is
apposite to note that even large unions, such as the United Auto Workers (uAw) (and, in Canada,
the Canadian Auto Workers (cAw)), have few economic assets compared to the enterprises with
which they deal. The Technology Adjustment Research Project of the Ontario Federation of
Labour, using data from the Corporationsand Labour UnionsReturnsAc, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-43 and
from D. Curry & D. Tripp, "Report on Business 1000" (July 1991) Report on Business Magazine 58,
has calculated that the combined assets of all the head offices of all unions in Canada would create
the equivalent of a "Union Inc.," which would rate only 148th on the list of corporations in Canada.
Or, again, the 160 corporate members of the Business Council on National Issues control assets
almost 1000 times larger than the combined assets of the head offices of the 494 unions in Canada.
Of course, union power comes not from financial assets, but from the ability to use economic force.
The significance of the unions' inability to act as integrated economic power brokers is thus
underscored.
25 In the 1960s, when they were the Big Three, the U.S. automobile corporations were
particularly vulnerable to localized strikes because of their reliance on a complex system of
fragmented part suppliers. Sales were good and stability in production was highly prized. The
automobile companies proposed sector-wide bargaining to the UAW which, interested in a certain
share of a growing pie, accepted the proposal. The legal, fragmented model, however, did not
change. See J.Holmes, "The Globalization of Production and the Future of Canada's Mature
Industries: The Case of the Automotive Industry" in Drache & Gertler, eds., supra note 1 at 153.
For examples of labour board and legislative efforts to enhance employee bargaining power, see text
below at notes 38-41.
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occur. But, from the employing classes' point of view, these are not its
only benefits.
D. PoliticallyWeak Unionism
The logic of employer-by-employer organization in the private
sector means that only narrow economic demands can be made of
employers at the bargaining table. This has given a particular cast to the
kind of unionism which has emerged. Union leaders frequently engage
in electoral politics, seeking to represent rank and file views and
interests. But there is always somewhat of a credibility gap as union
leaders are not permitted to use the economic power of the fragmented,
unionized labour force to support their socio-political demands. Their
influence is minimal as they cannot guarantee union members' electoral
support for any one political stance and they cannot punish politicians
who ignore them.26 There is a credibility gap because, at the workplace,
unions spend all their time educating workers to accept that unionism is
about the making of narrow economic demands. In short, the regime
splits the economic from the political in a very profound way. This is
obviously significant when attempting to use the labour power bestowed
by Canada's legalized collective bargaining regime to get the state to
develop a different macroeconomic strategy. The proof is in the
pudding: Canada's social welfare net has been very poor compared to
those in Western European countries where the political links between
unions, political parties, and actions have been more strongly forged and
27
where centralized bargaining is better established.
E. Privateand Public SectorDifferences
Another aspect of structural fragmentation makes cohesive
worker economic and political action difficult. The private and public
sector collective bargaining regimes employ the same language and some
26
27

L Panitch, "Corporatism in Canada" (1979) 1 Studies Pol. Econ. 42 at 84.

In terms of spending on the social wage as a percentage of gross domestic product, Canada
ranked thirteen out of eighteen OECD countries, in 1983: see J.S. O'Connor, "Welfare Expenditures
and Policy Orientation in Canada in Comparative Perspectives" (1989) 26:1 Can. Rev. Soc. & Anth.
131. This kind of data caused G. Esping-Andersen to position Canada, Australia, and the United
States at the bottom rung of the ladder which made up the spectrum of hyperliberalism (bottom) to
social equity (top): see G. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge:
U.K. Polity Press, 1990).
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of the same institutional mechanisms, but they are truly different worlds.
In particular, the right to strike in the public sectors is much more
restricted than it is in the private sphere, and the matters about which
public employees can bargain are much more limited. The argument is
simply that in these sectors, the use of economic power will inevitably
affect political decisions and, therefore, should be contained. Note the
paradox: where political demands do not make sense, that is, at the
private employer or local level, they are, logically enough, considered to

be legally unacceptable bargaining demands. Where they make eminent
sense, as demands do when made against governments that are in a
position to grant what is being asked, they may simply be prohibited.
F. Limited Scope and Coverage of Collective Bargaining

While collective bargaining has yielded substantial economic
benefits for many workers, it has not done so evenly. In particular, the
greatest gains have been made in the primary resource and mass
assembly manufacturing sectors, in large oligopolistically-placed
enterprises, where wage costs can be passed on more easily by employers
than they can by those in more competitive sectors. Precisely because
collective bargaining is based on an employer-by-employer model, it is
ill-suited to act as a national wage policy mechanism. It does not
function to overcome Canada's pronounced regional differences, which
are so characteristic of a resource-based, export-led economy 2 9 As a
result, in the more competitive sectors, workers, unionized or not, may

28 The right to strike in the public sector varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For an
overview, see J. Sack & T. Lee, "The Role of the State in Canadian Labour Relations" (1985) 44:1
Relations Industrielles 195.
29 j. Jenson, " 'Different' but not 'Exceptional': Canada's Permeable Fordism" (1989) 26:1
Can. Rev. Soc. & Anth. 69 at 80, notes that the "profound structuring efforts of a resource-based
economy in which natural wealth [is] distributed by geographic lottery" means that, unless
countervailing national policies are implanted, "uneven regional development [is] bound to follow."
Collective bargaining, although often touted as a Keynesian mechanism, was not characterized as a
national incomes policy by its most prestigious assessor, the Woods Task Force. Indeed, it argued
forcefully that the failure to redistribute national income or to abolish inequalities in income,
whether they arose because of regional differences, or because of inter- or intra-industry
differentiations, were not failures at all because the purpose of collective bargaining was not to
address these structural problems: see Task Force on Labour Relations, CanadianIndustrial
Relations: The Report of the Task Forceon LabourRelations (Ottawa: Privy Council, 1969).
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work for rates which may be as much as 40 per cent less than those paid
in the unionized primary sectors.30
Of course, income and job security are not the only benefits
yielded by collective bargaining. There is also what Geoffrey England
has called "the justice component." 31 Collective bargaining and the
attendant arbitral jurisprudence has imposed some constraints on the
ability of employers to exercise their managerial powers capriciously.
Even in those cases where wage gains are unlikely to be dramatic,
collective bargaining could have a positive impact. Nonetheless, given
that collective bargaining may not yield great economic results in the
more competitive sectors, there is less incentive for unions to put scarce
resources into organizing employers in those sectors, particularly where
the workplaces are small. The costs of organization and then, the
administration of ensuing agreements, will vastly outweigh the dues
obtained from members. The potential gains for the members of small
units may not be felt to be great enough to justify these "losses." This is
one reason for the relatively low rate of organization in small
employment places. This is important in the new industrial relations
setting.
As unions are losing members in the large employment setting,
mainly in Canadian manufacturing and resource industries, the work
rate participation is increasing exponentially. Many of the new
workforce entrants are working in service sectors where small employers
predominate in highly competitive situations. In 1990, half of the units
created in Ontario employed less than twenty people. In Canada as a
whole, 92 per cent of the employment growth between 1978 and 1983
occurred in firms that employed less than twenty persons. 2 That is, the
growth in employment is taking place precisely where the institution of
collective bargaining is likely to be most difficult to establish, and the
least likely to yield desired benefits.
G. The Family Wage Concept
A principal thrust of collective bargaining North American-style
in the post-war period was that it should provide a linkage between mass
30

C.F. Aw, A Dual Labour Market Analysis: A Study of CanadianManufacturing Industries
(Ottawa: Economic Analysis Branch, Labour Canada, 1980).
31 See supra note 22 at 92ff.
32 M. Cohen, "The Feminization of the Labour Market: Prospects for the 1990s" in D.

Drache, ed., supra note 4 at 105.
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production and mass consumption. Unionized workers in the resource
and mass production industries were offered contracts of indefinite
duration at wage rates that could sustain high consumer demand. Part
and parcel of this idea was the notion that the institution was to provide
a white male worker with sufficient income and job security to support
his family. The family wage concept was central to the institution.
While the goal to give a male worker adequate remuneration to support
a family was never completely achieved, it did succeed fairly well in the
leading sectors. As a result, the model was highly successful in its selfportrayal. It built on and reinforced patriarchal relationships. One of
the corollaries was that industrial unions displayed little interest in
organizing or protecting women, in either the public work-for-wages, or
the supposedly private household work, settings.
Now, as unionized, well paid, and secure jobs have become less
available, more and more women have been driven into the workforce.
Men's wages are being driven downwards and wages for women are low
because they are women, non-unionized, and employed in the most
competitive sectors. This undervaluation is a consequence of the
occupational "ghettoization" of women workers. 33 The expression used
to characterize this phenomenon and the downgrading of traditional
male jobs is the feminization of labour. It pits men in the work-forwages force against women and other new entrants, such as the young,
the old, men and women of colour, and the differently-abled---often
referred to as non-traditional workers. These new pools of cheap labour
create downward pressures. Thus, Acker's insight is plausible: what is
being experienced is not so much a crisis for capitalism as a distribution
crisis 3 4 This worker crisis is there to be exploited by employers and, as
expected, they are doing so'with a vengeance.
For a halcyon period of twenty-five years or so following World
War II, collective bargaining, with its notion of the family wage, seemed
to work both as a successful economic mechanism and a progressive,
liberal democratic one. There was little disruptive disputation between
employers, government, and organized labour about, and, therefore,
little political pressure to alleviate, the plight of unorganized workers.
They were left to the mercies of their own individual bargaining power.
The implicit justification was that, notionally, as collective bargaining
33
I. Bakker, "The Status of Women in OECD Countries" in R.S. Abella, ed., Research Studies
of the Commission on Equalityin Employment (Ottawa: Minister of Supplies and Services, 1985) 497

at 504.
34 J. Acker, Doing Comparable Worth. Gender, Class, and Pay Equity (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1989).
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was available to everyone, there was a ready-made institution to help
them obtain a decent family living standard. In this context, minimum
standards legislation was designed to relieve only the most extreme
forms of exploitation of workers who did not have any responsibility for
the maintenance of the living standards of others9 5 As a consequence,
the protections offered to vulnerable workers are very poor.3 6 The
increasing number of these workers available to employers, therefore,
has a depressing effect on wages and conditions.
From labour's perspective, this is the setting in which economic
restructuring is taking place. Organized labour is losing ground quickly
as employers pursue the logic of this restructuring uninhibited by the
rules of the dominant collective bargaining institution. Indeed, in
ideological terms, they may be helped by it. Yet, one of labour's
responses is to "beef up" this institution in order to reinforce protections
it thought it had. There are struggles for labour law reform, which will
facilitate union certification by making it easier to contact workers at
work, harder for anti-union, employer-supported workers to organize
petitions, and more difficult for employers to intimidate workers by
using their right to free speech. These reforms are aimed at overcoming
barriers which are costly, both in'time and money, and which make
organization more difficult. In the same vein, in more "labour friendly"
settings, such as Ontario, there have been successful demands to enable
unions to organize more easily in common site situations, such as
shopping malls, where an undue respect for feudal-type land rights has,
in the past, made it very difficult for unions.g7 While they are necessary,
these responses to the looming crisis for labour do not address the
fundamental problems labour faces. In particular:
1. They do not question the ideological underpinnings of the
Wagner Act model of collective bargaining which, as seen,
provides fertile soil for the macroeconomic policies of the

35 This case is made out with great insight by J. Fudge, Labour Law's Little Sister The
Employment StandardsAct and the Feminization of Labour (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives, 1991).
36 As seen, while Canada, in comparative terms, spends a great deal on health and education,
overall it ranks only thirteenth out of eighteen OECD countries in terms of social transfers as a
percentage of gross domestic product; see O'Connor, supra note 27. In particular, while Canada is
on a par or slightly better than the United States with respect to some standards, it fares badly when
compared with industrialized countries in Western Europe with respect to such major issues as
equal pay, occupational health and safety, unemployment benefits and retraining, paid parental
leave, vacation and sick leave, minimum wages, pensions, etc.
37 Since the writing of this paper, there has been some success in Ontario, with its more
labour-friendly government, on many of these fronts.
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hyperliberalism underlying the drive towards globalized,
productive free trade zones;
2. They do nothing to question the initial prerogatives of
management, which have left North American employers with
enormous control over job rights, in particular with respect to
farming out bargaining unit work;
3. They do little to enhance the bargaining clout of workers, who
might gain the right to unionize but who are faced with
relatively small employers buffeted by intense competitive
pressures;
4. They do not address the crisis of distribution, especially to the
extent that it is propagated and maintained by the downgrading
of women's work. While the unionization of women will
unquestionably help (and is proceeding at a reasonable pace,
given its initial poor starting position), the actual
undervaluation attached to ghettoized work is not adequately
confronted by this kind of labour law reform;
5. They do not address the question as to how the design and
implementation of industrial strategies based on integrated
productive activities are to be put on the state macroeconomic
planning agenda. They do not do so because the labour law
proposals do nothing to link the economic and the political, that
is, they do little to increase solidaristic political activities; and
6. They do not put workers in a position to demand, With power
and credibility, that a richer social net be established to inhibit
employers from exploiting competition amongst workers.
This diagnosis suggests several lines of attack.
IV. A TWO-PRONGED RESPONSE
A. InstitutionalReforms-Using the System's InternalLogic
When labour makes demands to limit the rights of counterpetitioners or asks for the right to meet with employees at the workplace
during working hours or to be allowed to treat shopping malls as public
places for the purposes of organizing and/or bargaining, it is making
plausible demands because such claims are consonant with the principles
which underlie the extant system of collective bargaining. The scheme
promotes the extension of collective bargaining rights to as many
workers as possible, and workers should be free to exercise it subject to
the need to respect the rights of property-owning employers and other
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individuals. There is nothing in these kinds of claims for reform that
offends the basic structure of the statutory collective bargaining
institution. This is why these reformist pushes meet with a measure of
success.
There is nothing in the written scheme which purports to favour
one set of bargaining outcomes over any other. Similarly, there is also
nothing in it-except existing practices and the real, but unarticulated
agenda to constrain unions-which proscribes different definitions of
"the employer" or "the appropriate bargaining unit" than the ones
presently used. Labour should seek such redefinitions. While collective
bargaining lore has embedded the notion of factory-by-factory, office-byoffice bargaining, this is not written in either stone or law. Arguments
for different kinds of bargaining relations are neither totally novel nor
unacceptable to existing labour jurisprudence. Moreover, the economic
restructuring, which employers are engineering, seeks to establish new,
functionally interdependent schemes of production, distribution, and
marketing. Hence, claims that labour relations boards should be
responsive to demands for the designation of bargaining units which
correspond to these employer efforts ought to have some resonance. 38
Such bargaining reforms should enable unions to address more
directly the fragmentations that disempower them. Efforts to coordinate
more solidaristic organization and bargaining may yield better economic
outcomes and raise political consciousness about the need to meet
capital's restructuring in a coherent fashion. It is the latter possibility
which may be the most useful consequence of engaging in an
orchestrated set of demands for more consolidated bargaining. It
follows that reform particulars sought with respect to restructured
bargaining agencies are not as important as the conscious effort to go
beyond procedural reforms, which would leave the power of employers
virtually unchanged. Some examples of the kinds of useful institutional
reforms that may be pursued are sketched out. They demonstrate that
some levers to obtain both changes which may yield immediate
economic protection and lay the ground for longer term political change
can be found within the logic of the scheme.
1. At a minimum, workers should fight to win the right to treat
various branches of any one employer in a defined geographical area as
38

These defensive actions being urged are not very radical, merely more militant than other
reforms. If unions win greater consolidated bargaining rights of the kind advocated, they will do so
because this mirrors capitalist organization. This reflects the theoretically reactionary, as opposed
to vanguard, nature of trade unionism. For a brief, analytical survey of the limited transformative
potential of unions, see R. Hyman, Marxism and the Sociology of Trade Unionism (London: Pluto
Press, 1973).
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one entity. That is, they should seek to be organized on an employerwide basis where it is beneficial. The scope of the chosen geographic
area is, of course, important. Power and strategy will determine the
nature of the demand. As a demand, it fits within the model's paradigm,
which holds that unions should be able to organize vis-i-vis their real
employer. In justification, this kind of bargaining organization is quite
common where it suits both parties. For instance, all the retail stores
that belong to one retailer in one geographic area are usually treated as
one bargaining unit for the purposes of labour relations statutes.3 9 More
co nvincingly, it can be pointed out that consolidated organization and
bargaining has met with instrumental approval by labour relations
boards and legislatures in Canada, as has its abandonment, when it
suited major employers.
Anne Forrest has documented how major meat-packing
employers, when they enjoyed an oligopolistic position, were pleased to
bargain on a nation-wide basis with the union. But, as competitive
pressures and new technologies changed their situation, these employers
sought to bargain on a more fragmented basis. The union failed to
convince the appropriate labour relations boards that this change in
bargaining practice unfairly undermined its long-established bargaining
position. The state agency held that the employers could insist on their
legal right to engage in more localized bargaining. 40 Another very well
known illustration of instrumental manipulation of bargaining units is
the Michelin Bill.41 There, the Nova Scotia legislature amended its
statute to enable a much-prized employer to remain union-free, even
though it appeared as if a majority of the workers at one of the
42
employer's plants had freely chosen to be represented by a union.
Similarly, for a long time the banks were able to exploit the argument
that the "employer" was all of the branches of a federally chartered bank
39

Or with the tacit blessing of labour relations boards, as was the case in the North American
automobile industry: see text at notes 24 and 25.
40 A. Forrest, "The Rise and Fall of National Bargaining in the Canadian Meat-Packing
Industry" (1989) 44:2 Relations Industrielles 393; and Bums Meats Ltd&v. U.F.C W.I.U., Local 139,
[1984] O.LR.B. Rep. 1049.
41 S.N.S. 1977, c. 70 and S.N.S. 1978, c. 34, amending The Trade UnionAct, S.N.S. 1972, c. 19.
42 For a critique of this nakedly pro-employer conduct, see B. Langille, "The Michelin
Amendment in Context" (1981) 6 Dalhousie Li.523. For a much less known example of almost
identical pro-employer, anti-union activity by a state agency, see the analysis of the British Columbia
Labour Relations Board in J. Baigent, "Protecting the Right to Organize" in J.M. Weler & P.A.
Gall, eds., The Labour Code of British Columbia in the 1980's (Calgary: Carswell, 1984) 45; and for
similar Saskatchewan developments, see R. Sass, "The Tory Assault on Labour in Saskatchewan"
(1987) 7 Windsor Y. B. Access Just. 133.
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in Canada, making organization virtually impossible. That is, because it
suited them, the employers argued for consolidated bargaining and the
labour boards supported them. When a labour relations board, under
pressure to recognize the obvious need of exploited women workers,
finally held that the local-by-local approach it used should generally
apply to banks, the banks foight vigorously to keep unions out. Workers
were forced to concede that branch-by-branch organization was not
likely to be. fruitful, given these large employers' continued
intransigence. A new compromise was sought from the administrative
agencies. The idea now is to cluster bank branches and activities which
are more or less functionally integrated in a geographical area and
designate them as "the employer." While some boards have been
responsive, how this new strategy will work itself out is still unknown. 43
The point is clear: branch-by-branch bargaining is neither legally
mandated, nor have public administrators always adhered to it
especially not when employers have asked for modifications. If the
appropriate bargaining union designation is malleable at the behest of
employers, it is legally and politically sound for labour to ask for
manipulations that favour it. The bank worker instance illustrates that
this potential is real.
2. Similarly, it is plausible for labour to demand that employees
of all franchisees in a given area be treated as the employees of the
franchisor. The argument, again, is that the franchisor is the real
employer and, therefore, the appropriate respondent for the labour
statute's purposes. For example, in the fast food industries, the reason
that each outlet is treated as a separate enterprise is merely to suit the
owners, who control every aspect of the operations. 44 Thus, unions can
argue that the functional integration of the employer's enterprise is to be
recognized in order to give collective bargaining meaning.

43 For the decision which upheld the employer's one bargaining unit position, see
KT.D.G.W.U., Local 1583 v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1959), 59 C.LLC 18,152 (C.LR.B.); for the
social pressures and union politics which led to the change in the labour relations board approach
(in S.O.1?W.U.C v. CanadianImperialBankof Commerce (1977), 77 C.L.LC 16,089 (C.L.R.B.)),
see J. Ainsworth et aL, An Account to Settle (Vancouver. Press Gang Publishers, 1979); EJ. Shilton
Lennon, "Organizing the Unorganized: Unionization in the Chartered Banks of Canada" (1980) 18
Osgoode Hall L J. 177; and R. Warskett, "Bank Worker Unionization and the Law" (1988) 25
Studies Pol. Econ. 41. For some of the decisions dealing with the cluster approach, compare
Syndicat des Employs des BanquesNationalesde Rimouski v. National Bank of Canada(1985), 86
C.LLC. 16,032 (C.LR.B.) with U.B.E. (Ont.), Local 2104 v. National Trust (1988), 88 C.LLC.
16,026 (O.LR.B.).
44 The detailed extent to which the franchisor controls the operations of each outlet is
thoroughly documented in E. Reiter, Making Fast Food: From the Frying Pan into the Fryer
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991).
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There is a good deal of analogous jurisprudence in other areas of
labour law, which can be used to support this argument. In employment
standard cases, tribunals have held that franchisees were minor cogs in
large integrated machines even though the franchisees were, initially,
proud to call themselves independent managers. Despite the fact that
their daily tasks are not supervised and they might exercise discretional
powers including the hiring of other workers, operators of franchised
variety stores and taxi-cabs have been classified as employees entitled to
statutory minima.4 5 A functional approach to business organization,
rather than a narrow legalistic one, then, is supported both by the logic
and the practices of labour relations jurisprudence. Employees in
franchise-type operations should exploit these possibilities.
This kind of consolidated bargaining would be a large step up. It
would make unionization of fast food services and the like more
attractive to existing unions and more feasible than it is now. It would
give people who are presently considered to be outside the paradigm of
"unionizable" workers an incentive to become organized. In short, it
would open up possibilities for some of the most oppressed workers in
our society. They would be given some standing to help themselves.
3. In some sectors, employers are not fragmented into several
functionally related units, yet their competitive positions are such that it
really does not make sense for workers to organize vis-ai-vis one
employer. The employer, forced to compete on everything including
wages, is simply not in a position to maintain decent living standards for
employees. That is, there are sectors in which employers can make a
profit only from sweated labour. In these situations, it makes sense,
from the workers' point of view, to group the employers together as one.
Owners of private nursing homes in a defined area are typical of such
employment settings. Again, this bargaining approach has employerinitiated analogues. It is the kind of bargaining structure employers in
the construction industries asked for and received when they felt that the
monopoly craft labour possessed had given it too much power. The
employers got legislatures to agree that a more satisfactory bargaining
position would be to certify all the employers within one province as a
union able to bargain with all the employees represented by one craft
union. They consolidated in order to avoid being played off against each
other by the workers. Atomized, free, collective bargaining was seen to
be disadvantageous by employers and they eliminated it by arguing that
the industry would be more stable and productive if wages were taken
45

Re Becker Milk Co. (1973), 1 LA.C. (2d) 337 (D.D. Carter); Armstrong v. Mac's Milk LtL
(1975), 7 O.R. (2d) 478 (H. C.); and Seven-Eleven, supra note 19.
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out of competition. 46 Workers should make similar arguments in those
sectors where wage competition is disadvantageous to them.
The thrust of the argument should be clear. The struggles urged
on labour will be difficult ones. Employers are pushing in the opposite
direction. They are continuously contracting out work to homeworkers,
to so-called independent contractors, and sometimes to other parts of
the globe where cheap labour and resources are available. All of this is
more feasible because new technologies make control over the
production of goods and services done elsewhere ever more possible.
Piecework and homework are back in vogue. This push has been helped
by the fact that the statutory safeguards workers have been able to win
against contracting-in or contracting-out are full of holes. Nonetheless,
protective provisions for dependent contractors, as well as union
protecting related employer, and successor rights do exist. The
acknowledgement implicit in their existence must be built upon.
The idea is to focus on the integrated nature of enterprises,
rather than on employer-determined criteria such as physical location,
common stationery, and bank accounts. Relocation of employers should
not permit the avoidance of existing bargaining rights or mean the loss of
jobs. Legislation sought should recognize functional integration which,
despite the legally subdivided nature of a business, allows people to
retain their bargaining and job rights. Inasmuch as there is recognition
by a business of the integration of various segments of its industrial
activities, labour should seek to organize itself along those lines and to
treat all legally discrete employers as being one employer for bargaining
purposes. The acceptance of the functional interdependence of
industrial organization, which is already part and parcel of wealth
owners' private industrial and financial planning, has to be made part
and parcel of the public administration of the collective bargaining
system.
These sketches of arguments are really arguments for a new
political agenda for labour. The focus is on how labour can best position
itself to deflect the worst effects of employer restructuring. But, the
strategies being promoted are not meant to be just defensive; they do
have the potential to create pressures for a different set of economic

46
The argument that employers should not be forced to compete on wages conflicted with the
public policy that promotes competition. It was controversial. As a consequence, before the

employers got their way, there were six major studies and commissions of inquiry in various

jurisdictions between 1968 and 1976. For a review of the statutory amendments which were
engineered, see R.M. Brown, "The Reform of Bargaining Structures in the Canadian
Industry" (1979) 3 Ind.Rel.L J. 539.
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policies, policies which do not seek to promote growth principally by
reliance on liberalized trade.
As workers struggle to consolidate.bargaining in the general ways
suggested, they will help to reveal and create an incentive for employers
to further the integration of production and research. The increased
transparency of the extent of rationalized productivity could help labour
convince governments that it is both possible and desirable to initiate
industrial strategies aimed at creating a relatively self-sufficient supply of
domestic markets and the development of niches based on Canada's
special advantages. In short, labour should pursue those policies which
social democrats and democratic socialists favour but do not seem to be
able to get on the agenda in the existing climate. To bolster this
potential, labour must pursue another line of attack at the same time as
it is pushing strategies for more consolidated bargaining.
B. Treatingthe LabourMarket as a Thole
The analysis presented in this paper holds that more and more
workers are being chased out of the labour market core and pushed into
the periphery. This has resulted from the drive to get rid of both unions
and protective governmental regulations, and is being done under the
rubric of liberalized trade and competitiveness. Employers are
demanding a "level playing field" so that they can compete with foreign
producers, who have the benefit of cheap resources and labour, and no
constraining government regulations. It is a drive to the bottom.
Employers argue that they should be able to deploy new technologies in
order to get more flexible work production. More often than not, they
mean flexible workers rather than flexible processes. They would like to
be able to employ workers at many skilled positions and on schedules
that suit the kind of productivity aimed, not at satisfying mass
consumption, but at specialized quality or quantity production. In short,
there are to be less workers in the core and they are to be made more
flexible in terms of control over their time and the nature of the work
they do. In other words, they are to be more like workers in the
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periphery.4 7 The availability of larger pools of unprotected labour
makes these employer goals easily attainable.
Workers in the periphery are to be found overwhelmingly in
small employment settings in the service sectors, where undervalued
work done by women, part-'time, casual, and temporary workers is the
norm and where only minimal state guarantees exist. Indeed, these
minimal guarantees do not apply to some of the workers found in these
sectors.
Organized labour must band together with unorganized labour
to overcome these downward-working tendencies. Increased labour
protection for all workers must be sought. First, all people who are
found in the work-for-wages sector must be covered by the state's
minimum standards provisions. In particular, agricultural workers,
domestic workers, part-time workers, casual workers, temporary
workers, and homeworkers should be covered by statutory provisions
dealing with such matters as minimum wage rates, vacation pay, sick pay,
regulation and overtime pay, public pension rights, and workers'
compensation. There are to be no exceptions. The fight must then be to
enrich those programmes, as our minimum standards lag behind those of
most of the advanced industrialized nations.
Second, there are some matters which must be taken out of the
private bargaining realm of regulation. In particular, the plan must be to
develop pay equity programming based on state-wide, occupation
transcending policies. Private bargaining, on an employer-by-employer
basis, is simply counterproductive as long as patriarchal relationships
continue to ghettoize and undervalue the work of women in some
sectors.
Third, there must be an emphasis on making the provision of
infrastructure and services public rather than private. This has several
positive aspects. It will go some way towards debunking the ideological
dominance of the notion that welfare is best created by private actors
who have been "given their head." Simultaneously, as goods production
employment opportunities diminish, jobs must be found. A vigorous
campaign to have the state provide high-quality services which citizens
47

For a thorough empirical analysis, see D. Robertson & J. Wareham, Changing Technology
and Work: Northern Telecom (Toronto: CAW Technology Project, 1989). For a sobering
governmental assessment of Canadian use of the new technologies, see Economic Council of
Canada, Making Technology Work- Innovation and Jobs in Canada:A Statement by the Economic
Council of Canada(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1987) 20, which stated: "On balance ...
it appears that many firms ...
are operating according to traditional principles of work design and
decision-making.... [Flar too many Canadian firms pay only lip service to the 'people' side of the
enterprise."
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need, such as day care, rather than leave this to the vagaries of the
market, may make it possible to create jobs which require high training
and command good wages for people who, otherwise, would be driven
into the poor-paying service sectors. This would leave a smaller pool of
workers available to work for employers who can only compete by using
sweated labour, such as employers in the fast food industries or private
nursing homes. In making this argument, Myles indicates that EspingAndersen has found that the promotion of more high quality publicly
rendered services has dramatic impacts. For instance, in Sweden, 26 per
cent of the labour force is in health, education, and welfare industries,
while only 2 per cent is in food and accommodation services; the
comparative numbers in the United States are 17 per cent and 7 per
cent. 48 In order to bolster this alternative, a more public serviceoriented strategy, it is important that public sector workers and their
unions argue for improvement in the quality and reach of services as
they fight for wages and their jobs. Drache and I have argued this
elsewhere 49
Fourth, it is important that organized labour, formerly
concentrated in the core sectors, must-not only because it is right, but
also because it is beneficial-assist in the unionization of women and
support them in their pursuit of pay equity and decent jobs. First, this
can be done by helping them unionize in a far more vigorous manner
than has been done. Additionally, unions must abandon the maleoriented notion that a family wage can, and should, be earned by a man.
They must abandon both their patriarchal approach and the approach
dictated to them by the political economy, namely that of behaving like
"Rational Economic Men." Women do not want to be merely people
with "men-like" jobs; they would like to see a differently-centred world.
Unions will not be attractive to women until this kind of politics is
accepted by them. It is necessary to have more women unionized
(something that is happening), and that they assume more leadership
positions in trade unions (something that is occurring much more
slowly). This is not enough. There must also be a feminization of
unions. A change in both the composition and character of unions is
necessary.
Part and parcel of this kind of politics requires unions to
abandon the notion that collective bargaining is the best way to obtain
48 This argument is made in detail in J. Myles, "Decline or Impasse? The Current State of the
Welfare State" (1988) 26 Studies Pol. Econ. 73.
49
D. Drache & H. Glasbeek, "The New Fordism In Canada: Capital's Offensive, Labour's
Opportunity" (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall L. J. 517.
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pay equity. Many unions and women's groups are aware that one of the
flaws of the various pay equity and equal pay for work of equal value
schemes is that they are implemented on the basis of existing bargaining
structures. Though difficult, it is essential to put proposals on the
agenda which are designed to overcome both the problems of existing
bargaining fragmentations and the stereotyping, which governs the
evaluation systems promoted and controlled by employers 5 0 Conscious
struggles along these lines may narrow the harmful gender gaps which
debilitate labour and render civil society less acceptable than it might be.
This suggests another avenue of attack.
When one family member is a member of a union, altered union
rules would make that member's partner a voting member of the union.
This would help make the linkage between the work-for-wages sphere
and the domestic sphere more apparent. It could also provide an
impetus for better coordination between men and women's struggles.
The point here, of course, is not to provide a blueprint for action,
but an indication of the kinds of struggles which can, and must, be
undertaken.
V. THE POLITICS BEHIND THE ARGUMENTS
The central idea driving the various struggles advocated in this
article-whether they be the endorsement of the conventionallyacceptable push for better worker protection when they seek to organize,
or the more seemingly Utopian idea of functionally integrated
bargaining and increased government sector activity and
intervention-is an acknowledgement that today's capitalism is so much
purer and more homogenous than it has been in the past that workers
may not see how pervasive it has become. It must seem to many people
that what is could not be otherwise. It is hard to mobilize against, or to
resist, something which seems as natural as the surrounding air. It is
precisely for this reason that capitalists have been able to take advantage
of the institutionally-created fragmentations among working people.

50 DJ. Lewis, in.ust Give Us the Money:A Discussion of Wage Discriminationand Pay Equity
(Vancouver. Women's Research Centre, 1988) 113-128, has recorded a variety of alternative
proposals by union groupings which seek to transcend traditional bargaining structures but notes
that these proposals still accept employer-controlled job evaluation as a central element. These,
then, are necessary first steps; more is needed. For instance, sharp increases in the minimum wage
would help women more than localized comparisons with poorly paid men: see Equal Pay Coalition,
Bringing Pay Equity to those PresentlyFxcludedfrom Ontario'sPay EquityAct, Submission to the Pay
Equity Commission, Toronto, 13 December 1988.
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Further, capital is in a great position to exploit racism and patriarchy,
forms of oppression which are neither created by or essential to
capitalism, but which are expressed within its relations of subordination.
Workers cannot afford incoherent responses to the economic
restructuring that emphasizes these fragmentations.
The fights being urged upon labour are attempts to promote the
notion that, despite appearances to the contrary, the working classes
may help meld the many social movements formed to resist the
fragmented oppressions which take place in late capitalism. The
working classes are still potential, perhaps even the best, agents to lead
the fight for social transformation. The kind of labour organization and
politics advocated in this article attempt to give people the means to see
that their shared interests are more important than their apparent
differences. At the same time, they set out to protect their immediate
interests51
These proposals ask workers to fight where they are. They are to
make claims which emphasize solidarity and are functionally compatible
with the dominant ideology. At the same time as workers struggle to
better their own situation, they will also be participating in efforts to
enlarge and enrich the social net. Welfare and security as a citizen's
right will thus be put on the political agenda. This could create the kind
of political electoral force which might convince policy makers that
labour cooperation can only be obtained if some of its demands are
satisfied 5 2 It is only in this context that the state is likely to assert its
inherent power to impose different kinds of industrial strategies on its
domestic capitalists. It is only in this context that managed trade and
industrial integration can be thought of as sensible alternatives by policy
makers.
What else is there?

51 For a further argument supporting this (acknowledgedly contentious) point of view, see J.
Fudge & H. Glasbeek, "The Politics of Rights: A Politics with Little Class" (1992) 1 Social Legal
Studies 45.
52 They can get more clout, of course, if they control large pools of capital. Politically, this is
hard to achieve. Theoretically, the pools known as pension funds are available for this purpose.
This, too, should be part of the politics I advocate. For a discussion of the possibilities, see
Mathews, supranote 4 at c. 3.

